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JUSTICE OR HARMONY ? RECONCILIATION AFTER STASIS  
IN DIKAIA AND THE FOURTH-CENTURY BC POLIS*
Benjamin GRAY**
Résumé. – Une fois la paix rétablie après une période de guerre civile (stasis), les cités 
grecques se trouvaient confrontées à un choix difficile entre la justice et l’harmonie  : soit 
les coupables, une fois désignés, devaient être punis, soit l’ordre civique et la concorde 
devaient être rétablies entre tous les citoyens, sans provoquer des récriminations. J’aborde 
cette problématique en me concentrant sur une inscription publiée récemment concernant les 
termes d’une réconciliation qui eut lieu à Dikaia en Chalcidique entre 365 et 359 av. J.-C. Il 
est frappant que les conciliateurs à Dikaia, contrairement à la plupart des autres conciliateurs 
bipartites grecs, ne se soient pas empêchés de donner aux citoyens une occasion de poursuivre 
des revendications de justice contre les prétendus malfaiteurs. Selon cet article, cette décision 
rare et assez audacieuse doit être comprise comme, en partie, la mise en oeuvre des valeurs et 
idées civiques, complexes et cohérentes, que l’inscription exprime. D’ailleurs, ce texte illustre 
bien comment les inscriptions des cités grecques dévoilent, d’une façon nouvelle, la pensée 
éthique et politique de la cité grecque.
Abstract. – When peace was restored after a civil war (stasis), a Greek city faced a difficult 
choice between justice and harmony : it had to give priority either to assigning blame 
and punishment, or to re-establishing civic order and concord among all citizens, without 
provoking recriminations. This article discusses the approach taken to this question at Dikaia 
in Chalkidike in the period c. 365-359 BC, in the light of a recently published inscribed 
reconciliation settlement. The argument is that it is striking that the arbitrators at Dikaia, 
unlike most authors of Greek bipartisan reconciliation settlements, did not hold back from 
giving citizens an opportunity to pursue claims to justice against alleged wrongdoers. It is 
suggested that this unusual and quite bold decision must be explained partly as an application 
of the complex and consistent civic values and ideals expressed in the inscription. Indeed, this 
text demonstrates well how the inscriptions of Greek cities can shed new light on ethical and 
political thinking within the Greek polis
Mots-clés. – Polis, Dikaia, réconciliation, amnistie, justice, concorde, citoyenneté, contrat social.
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1. – INTRODUCTION
After a severe stasis (civil war) in the period 365-359 BC, the divided citizens of the 
small city of Dikaia in Chalkidike attempted to arrive, with the help of arbitrators, at a 
reconciliation agreement which would enable them to return to peaceful civic life. The terms 
of the reconciliation settlement on which they agreed are preserved in a recently published 
inscription 1. This new inscription represents an important addition to the epigraphic evidence 
for Greek approaches to bipartisan reconciliation after stasis 2. In its basic structure and 
instructions, the new inscription resembles the pattern attested elsewhere : measures to 
re-establish civic peace and institutions are followed by a detailed oath of reconciliation, to be 
sworn by all citizens. This article argues, however, that the Dikaiopolitan reconciliation is also 
more unfamiliar in certain respects.
As far as its practical measures of reconciliation are concerned, the Dikaiopolitan 
settlement includes a quite unexpected approach to the question of retrospective justice : 
the question whether citizens should be tried and punished for violence committed during 
the period of stasis. This article seeks first to demonstrate what is unfamiliar about the 
Dikaiopolitan approach to justice and reconciliation, then to account for the departure from 
the norm. It argues that at least part of the solution to the problem lies in the complex and 
coherent Dikaiopolitan civic values expressed and developed in the document : the underlying 
ideals help to explain the quite distinctive approach to retrospective justice. In other words, 
understanding the political ideas underlying, and advocated in, the settlement is necessary for 
understanding its institutional details. 
As a by-product of developing this argument about a single case-study, this article seeks 
to show the value of studying ancient Greek inscriptions as evidence for political and ethical 
ideas. It is suggested that the Dikaiopolitan document is an excellent example of the ways in 
which inscribed civic texts can be used to enrich the evidence for the varieties of political and 
ethical thought and rhetoric within Greek poleis. This is especially true of documents, such 
as the Dikaia inscription, which deal with questions of inclusion and exclusion of citizens. 
Re-integrating exiles into the citizen-body and restoring civic life required citizens to engage 
with fundamental issues of ethics and politics, in a way which is very revealing of basic political 
assumptions, including those which also exercised a strong influence outside the immediate 
context of reconciliation.
1. e. Voutiras, K. sismanides, « Δικαιπολιτών συναλλαγαί. Μια νέα επιγραφή από τη Δίκαια » in 
Ancient Macedonia  : Seventh International Symposium, Thessaloniki 2007, p. 255-274 ; e. Voutiras, « La 
réconciliation des Dikaiopolites : une nouvelle inscription de Dikaia de Thrace, colonie d’Erétrie », CRAI 2008, 
p. 781-792. See also SEG 57.576 ; BE 2008, nos. 263 and 339. Voutiras and sismanides discuss in detail many of 
the revealing historical, linguistic and institutional features of the document.
2. The previously known epigraphic evidence is collected and analysed in a. dössel, Die Beilegung 
innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Frankfurt 2003.
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2. – THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF THE DIKAIOPOLITAN SETTLEMENT
Dikaia is known to have been an Eretrian colony. The proximity of the names in this 
settlement to Classical Eretrian names has been used as evidence that Dikaia must have been a 
relatively late Eretrian colony. Knoepfler suggests that Dikaia may have been founded by pro-
Persian Eretrian exiles some time in the 470s BC 3. On that hypothesis, as Knoepfler argues, 
the name Dikaia (« Just City ») would have a clear social and political meaning : it would be 
a claim to justice directed against the incumbent regime in Eretria 4 .
Because King Perdikkas III is named as ruling Macedonia at the time, the document 
of reconciliation must date within his reign (365-359 BC) 5. The following is the text of the 
settlement 6, followed by a translation :
 [vacat Θεός? ˙] Τύχη Ἀ[γ]αθή. ἔδοξε τῆι ἐκ[κλησίηι˙ γνώμη]ν̣
 [περ]ὶ̣ τῶν συναλ[λα]γῶμ παρήν[εγκε]ν? Λύ[κιος καὶ] οἱ συν-
 αλλακταί. περὶ τ[ού]των πάντων ψηφί[ζ]ο[ντ]α Λύκιον καὶ
 ἐπιτελέοντα ἐν [τ]ῆι ἐκκλησίηι κύριον εἶ[ν]αι. ἔδοξε τῆι
5 ἐκκλησίηι˙ τοὺς [π]ολίτας πάντας ὀμ̣όσ[α]ι τὸν ὅρκον τὸ[ν]
 συγγεγραμμένο[ν] ἐν τρισὶν ἱεροῖς τοῖς [ἁ]γιωτάτοις καὶ
 ἐ̣ν ἀγορῆι, Δία, Γῆν, [Ἥ]λ̣ιομ, Ποσειδῶ, κάπ̣ρο[ν] ἱερεύσαντας.
 ὁ̣ρκω̣σάτω δὲ Λύκ̣ιος καὶ οἱ συνα̣λλ̣ακταί. τὸν δὲ ὅρκο-
 ν καὶ τὰ πιστώματα πάντα γράψαντας εἰς λίθον
10 θεῖναι εἰς τὸ ἱερ̣ὸ̣ν τῆς Ἀθηναίης. [θε]ῖναι δὲ καὶ
 εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὸν ὅρκον τὸν αὐτὸ̣γ καὶ τὰ πισ-
 τώματα γράψαντας εἰς λίθον. ὀμόσαι δὲ πάν-
 τας ἐ̣ν τρισὶν ἡμ̣έ̣ραις. ὅσο̣ι δ’ ἀπο̣δ[η]μοῦσιν ἢ ἀσ-
 θ̣ενοῦσιν, τὸμ μ̣ὲ̣ν̣ ἀπόδημον ὀμόσαι καὶ ἁγνισθ-
3. See BE 2008, no. 263.
4. Compare the choice of the name Dikaiarcheia by the founders of the future Puteoli, exiles from Polycrates’ 
Samos, in the 520s BC : b.m. mitchell, « Herodotus and Samos », JHS 95, 1975, p. 75-91, p. 87 ; d.g.s. shipley, 
A History of Samos, 800-188 BC, Oxford 1987, p. 91.
5. The letter forms are consistent with this date : e. Voutiras and K. sismanides, Δικαιπολιτών συναλλαγαί, 
p. 257.
6. Taken from e. Voutiras, « La réconciliation des Dikaiopolites », p. 787-789.
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15 ῆναι ἐπει̣δὰν ἔ̣λθ̣ηι τριῶν ἡμερῶν̣, τὸν δὲ ἀσθεν-
 οῦντα ἐπειδὰν ὑγιὴς γενηθῆι ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις
 ὀμόσαι. ὁρκωσάντων δὲ πρὸς ταὐτά. ὃς δ’ ἂμ μ[ὴ ὀ-]
 μό̣σηι τὸν ὅρκον καθάπερ γέγραπται, τ̣ὰ χρήματα [α-]
 ὐτοῦ ἱερὰ καὶ δημόσια ἔστω̣ τοῦ Ἀ[π]όλλωνος το[ῦ]
20 Δαφνηφόρου ἄτιμός τε ἔστω καὶ τ̣[ῶ]ν δικαίων α[ὐ]-
 τῶι μηδενὸς μετέστω. μάρτυρα δ[ὲ] καὶ συνίστορ[α]
 τῶν ὅρκωγ καὶ τῶμ πιστωμάτωμ π[ά]ντωμ Περδί[κ-]
 καμ ποιήσασθαι, δεηθῆναι δὲ αὐ[το]ῦ, ἄν τινές πο̣-
 τε τοὺς ὅρκους κ̣[αὶ] τ̣ὰ πιστώματα ἐ̣[γβ]άλλωσι, τού-
25 τους δυνατὸν [ἐ]όντα θανάτωι ζ[ημι]ῶσαι, ἤν τε
 φύγωσι, ἀγωγίμους εἶν αὐτοὺς Δι[και]οπολίταις ἐ-
 κ τῆς χώρης πάσης ἧς ἐπάρχει Π[ερ]δίκκας. ἔδοξ-
 ε τῆι ἐκκλησίηι˙ δίκας ὅσαι φονικαί ἐσι πρὸ τ̣[ῆς] Γ̣οργύθου ἀρχῆς,
 αὐτὰς ἐγδικάσασθαι πάσας ἐπὶ Γοργύθο̣[υ ἄρχον]τ̣ος μηνὸς Δα-
30 φνηφοριῶνος πέμπτηι φθ̣ίνοντος˙ ὃς δ’ ἂ[μ] μ̣ὴ̣ ἐγδικάσηται, [ἀ-]
 πόκλετα αὐτῶι ἔστω. ἂμ δέ τις δῶι δίκημ φο[νι]κ̣ὴ̣<ν> ἢ 
δικάζητα[ι ὅ-]
σα ἀπόκλετα ἡ ἐκκλησί[η] ἐψηφίσατο, ὁ μὲ̣[ν δ]ικ[α]ζόμενος
φ[ευ-]
 γέτω τὴν γῆν τὴν Δικαιοπολιτῶν καὶ τὰ [χ]ρ[ή]ματα αὐτο[ῦ ἔ-]
 στω δημόσια, ὁ δὲ διδο̣[ὺ]ς τὴν δίκην ἄτι[μο]ς [ἔ]στω καὶ τ̣ὰ
35 χρήματα [α]ὐτ̣οῦ ἱερὰ καὶ δημόσια ἔστω τοῦ Ἀ[π]όλλωνος τ[ο-]
 ῦ Δαφνηφόρο. εἰ δέ τι ἄλ̣λ̣ο ἐγκαλοῦσι Δήμ[αρχο]ς ἢ οἱ μετὰ Δη̣-
 μάρχου φυγόντες τοῖς μετὰ Ξενοφῶντ̣[ος] ἢ̣ Ξενοφῶν ἢ ο[ἱ]
 μετὰ Ξενοφῶντος τούτοις ἐγκαλοῦ̣[σ]ι̣, ὅσα πρὸ τῆς Γ̣-
 οργύθου ἀρχῆς ἐγκλήματα ἐγένοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τ-
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40 ούτοις ἀπόκλετα εἶναι πάντα καὶ περὶ τ̣[ο]ύ̣των μήτε δ-
 ικαζέσθω μηδεὶς μήτε ἄρχων δίκην δ̣ι̣δότω˙ ἂ[ν] δὲ δ-
 ικάζηται ἢ διδῶι, ὁ μὲν δικαζόμενο̣ς ἄτιμος [ἔ]σ̣τω κ-
 αὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω, τοῦ δὲ διδ[ό]ν̣τος
 τὴν δίκην τὰ χρήματα ἱερὰ καὶ δημόσια ἔστω [τ]ο̣ῦ Ἀπ-
45 όλλωνος τοῦ Δαφνηφόρου. ἔδοξε τῆι ἐκκ̣λησίηι˙ τοὺς Ἱέ-
 ρωνος παῖδας καὶ Ἐ̣πικράτην καὶ ᾿Αργαῖον τὰς δίκας κ-
 αὶ τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰ πιστώματα δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι
 ἐν τῶι μηνὶ τῶι Ληναιῶνι καὶ Ἀνθεσστηριῶνι καθάπ-
 {π}ερ συγ<γ>έγραπται ὁ ὅρκος. ἂν δὲ μὴ ποήσωσι τὰ δεδογ-
50 μένα, στερέσθωσαν τῶν ἐγκλημάτωγ πάντων
 ὅσα πρὸ τῆς Γοργύθου ἀρχῆς ἐγένετο καὶ τῶι ὅρκ-
 ωι ἔνοχοι ἔστων. ἔδοξε τῆι ἐκκλησίηι˙ τοὺς παῖδ-
 ας τοὺς Ἑρμίππου καὶ Ἐπιχάρεος καὶ Δημωφέλε-
 ος, τούτων τοὺς μὲν ἐπιδημοῦντας ὀμνύειν κ-
55 αὶ ἁγνίζειν καὶ ἁγνίζεσθαι καὶ τὰ πιστώματα δ[ι-]
 δόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι πάντα, τοὺς δ’ ἀποδημοῦντα-
 ς, ὅταν ἔλθωσι, ὀμνύειν καὶ ἁγν[ί]ζειν καὶ ἁγ[νί-]
 ζεσθαι καὶ τὰ πιστώματα πάντα διδόν[α]ι κα̣[ὶ δέ-]
 χεσθαι˙ ὃς δ’ ἂμ παραβῆι τῶγ γεγραμμένω[ν τι,]̣
60 ἔνοχος ἔστω κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ἔδοξε τῆι ἐκκλ[η-]
 σίηι. οἱ δὲ ὅρκοι καὶ τὰ πιστώματα ἐγένον[το]
 καὶ τὰ ἀπόκλειτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις πᾶσι ἐκ-
 τὸς Δάφνωνος τοῦ Πολυζήλο καὶ Κηφισοδώρ[ο] τοῦ
 Ἀγαθοκλέος. τούτοις δέ, ἐπειδὰν τὰς δίκας δῶσ[ι] καὶ δέξ-
65 ωνται κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἂν ἀποφύγωσι, μετεῖνα<ι> τῶν ὅρκ-
 ων κα[ὶ τῶ]μ πιστωμάτων πάντων, ὧμπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πο-
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 λίταις. ὅ̣ρκος˙ πολιτεύσομαι ἐπίπασι δικαί<ω>ς καὶ δημο-
 σίαι καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ τὴμ πολιτείαν οὐ μεταστήσω τὴμ πα-
 τρίαν, οὐδὲ ξένους εἰσδέξομαι ἐπὶ βλάβηι τοῦ κοινοῦ
70 τοῦ Δικαιοπολιτέων οὐτὲ ἰδιώτεω οὐδὲ ἑνός˙ καὶ οὐ μν-
 ησικακήσω οὐδενὶ οὔτ̣[ε] λόγωι οὔτε ἔργωι˙ καὶ οὐ θανατώσω
 οὐδένα οὐδὲ φυγῆι ζημιώσω οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρήσομ[α-]
 ι ἕνεκα τῶμ παρηκόντων˙ καὶ ἄν τις μνησικα̣κ̣ῆι, οὐκ αὐ[τ-]
 ῶι ἐπιτρέψω˙ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶμ β̣ωμῶν καθελέω καὶ καθαιρεθ[ή-]
75 σομαι˙ καὶ πίστιν δώσω καὶ δέξομαι τὴν αὐτήν˙ καὶ ἁγνιῶ̣ 
 καὶ ἁγνιοῦμαι καθότι ἂν τάξ̣[ηι]
 [τ]ὸ κοινόν˙ καὶ εἴ τινα ἐπίστωσα
 [ἢ] ἐπιστωσάμην, δώσω καὶ δ-
 [έ]ξομαι καθάπερ ἐπίστωσα καὶ 
80 ἐπιστωσάμην˙ ἔν τε ταῖς δί-
 καις αἷς ἐδίκασεν ἡ πόλις ἐμ-
 μενέω˙ καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλον ὅρκ[ον]
 ὤμοσα, λύω, τόνδε δὲ σπουδαιότα̣-
 τομ ποιήσομαι. ταῦτα ἔμπεδο̣ρ-
85 κήσω ναὶ μὰ Δία, Γῆν, Ἥλιομ, Πο-
 σειδεώ. εἰ μὲν εὐορκήσαιμι,
 πολλά μοι ἀγαθὰ γίνοιτο κ̣α̣[ὶ]
 [αὐ]τῶι καὶ παισὶ καὶ χρήμασ[ι˙]
 [ε]ἰ δὲ ἐπιορκήσαιμι, κακῶς [ἐ-]
90 μ̣οὶ γίνοιτο καὶ αὐτῶι καὶ πα[ι-]
 σὶ καὶ χρήμασι. δέχομαι ἀπὸ το̣[ῦ]
 βωμοῦ παραθήκην παρὰ τοῦ Ἀπ[ό-]
 [λ]λωνος κατὰ τοὺς ὅρκους οὓς ὤμ̣-
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 οσα, εἰ μὲν ἐ[μ]μείναιμι ἐν τοῖς
95 ὅρκοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πιστώμασι π-
 [ᾶ]σι, πολλά μοι κἀγαθὰ γίνοιτο 
 καὶ αὐτῶι καὶ παισὶ καὶ χρήμασι˙ εἰ δὲ
 [ἐπιο]ρ̣κήσαιμι δεξάμενος πα-
 [ραθ]ήκην παρὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος,
100 [ἐ]ξ̣ώλης εἴην καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γέ-
 νος τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχον-
 τα πάντα˙ τιμωρήσειεν δὲ ὁ
 [θ]εὸς παρ’ οὗ ἔλαβον τὴν παρ-
 αθήκην μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων
105 θεῶν πάντων.
[vacat God (?) ;] Good Fortune. Resolved by the assembly : Lykios and the conciliators made the 
following proposal concerning the reconciliation. Concerning all relevant matters, Lykios should have 
authority for putting them to the vote and putting them into force in the assembly. 
Resolved by (line 5) the assembly : all the citizens should swear the oath which has been drawn 
up in the three most sacred sanctuaries and in the agora, by Zeus, Earth, Sun and Poseidon, having 
sacrificed a boar. Let Lykios and the conciliators administer the oath. Having written up the oath and all 
the pledges on stone, (10) they should place them in the sanctuary of Athene. They should also place in 
the agora the same oath and the pledges, having written them on stone. All should swear within three 
days. As for those who are abroad or ill : he who is abroad should swear and be purified (15) within 
three days of whatever date he returns ; he who is ill should swear within three days of whatever date he 
recovers. Let them administer the oath to them on the same terms. Whoever does not swear the oath as it 
has been written, let his property be public and sacred to Apollo (20) Daphnephoros, let him be without 
civic rights and let him have no access to justice. Perdikkas should be made witness and guarantor of the 
oaths and all the pledges and it should be requested of him that, if anyone overturns the terms of the oath 
and the pledges, he should (25), if he is able, put them to death, and that, if they flee, the Dikaiopolitans 
should be allowed to arrest them anywhere in the territory of which Perdikkas is in control.
Resolved by the assembly : All the murder cases which arose before the magistracy of Gorgythos 
should be prosecuted during Gorgythos’ magistracy on the fifth day from the end (30) of the month of 
Daphnephorion. If anyone does not prosecute, let the charges be excluded for him. If anyone admits a 
murder case or brings a suit which the assembly voted to exclude, the man who brings the suit should be 
exiled from the territory of the Dikaiopolitans and his property should be made public and the one who 
admits the case should lose his civic rights (35) and his property should be made public and sacred to 
Apollo Daphnephoros. If Demarchos or those who fled with Demarchos make any other charges against 
Xenophon’s faction, or Xenophon or Xenophon’s faction make charges against them, the charges which 
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arose between them before Gorgythos’ magistracy should be excluded and no one (40) should bring a 
suit and no magistrate should admit a case about them. If anyone brings a suit or admits a case, the one 
who brings the suit should lose his civic rights and his property should be made public and the property 
of the one who admits the case should be made public and sacred to Apollo (45) Daphnephoros.
Resolved by the assembly : the sons of Hieron and Epikrates and Argaios should bring and incur 
suits and give and receive the oaths and the pledges in the months of Lenaion and Anthesterion in 
accordance with the oath which has been written up. If they do not do what has (50) been decided, let 
them be deprived of all charges which arose before the magistracy of Gorgythos and let them be liable 
in accordance with the oath.
Resolved by the assembly : the children of Hermippos and Epichares and Demopheles, of these 
those who are in the city should swear and (55) give and receive purification and give and receive all 
pledges ; those who are abroad, whenever they arrive, should swear and give and receive purification 
and give and receive all pledges. Anyone who transgresses anything which has been written (60) should 
be liable according to the oath which was agreed by the assembly.
The oaths and the pledges and the exclusions happened for all the other citizens except for Daphnon, 
son of Polyzelos, and Kephisodoros, son of Agathokles. These men, whenever they bring and incur suits 
(65) according to the law, if they are acquitted, should participate in all the oaths and the pledges, the 
same as the other citizens.
Oath : I will be just in my behaviour as a citizen towards all in public and in private affairs. I will 
not change the ancestral constitution, nor will I admit foreigners to the detriment of the commonwealth 
(70) of the Dikaiopolitans or of any individual. I will not bear grudges towards anyone in word or deed. 
I will not put anyone to death or punish anyone with exile or confiscate anyone’s property for the sake 
of what is in the past. If anyone does bear a grudge, I will not allow him. I will take down (others) 
from the altars (75) and be taken down myself. I will give and receive the same good faith. I will give 
and receive purification as the commonwealth orders. If I bound anyone by a pledge or gave a pledge 
myself, I will give and receive as I exacted or gave (80) a pledge. I will remain faithful to the judgements 
which the polis made. If I swore some other oath, I revoke it, and I will make this one the most binding. 
I will uphold these sworn pledges (85) by Zeus, Earth, Sun and Poseidon. If I keep my oath, may many 
good things happen to myself, my children and my property. If I break my oath, may things (90) turn 
out badly for me and my children and my property. I am receiving a deposit from the altar of Apollo in 
accordance with the oaths which I swore. If I remain faithful to (95) the oaths and all the pledges, may 
many good things occur for me and my children and my property. If I break my oath after receiving a 
deposit from Apollo (100), may I be utterly destroyed, myself and my line and all my property, and may 
the god from whom I took the deposit punish me with all the (105) other gods.
The text begins with five decrees of the assembly of Dikaia regarding the reconciliation 
after stasis, probably passed at one sitting of the assembly 7. The first decree (ll. 1-4) empowers 
Lykios, the chair of the arbitrators, to have the proposals of the arbitrators voted upon and put 
into force in the assembly. This could indicate that Lykios was a foreigner, possibly appointed 
by King Perdikkas, who needed special authorisation to appear in the Dikaiopolitan assembly 8. 
7. e. Voutiras, K. sismanides, Δικαιπολιτών συναλλαγαί, p. 261-262.
8. Compare SEG 57.576, n. 1  : the view that Lykios and the arbitrators were foreigners may gain support 
from the fact that they were to administer the oath ; it is not explicitly stated that they were to swear themselves.
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However, it is equally possible that Lykios was a Dikaiopolitan citizen who was here given 
special permission to attend and preside over meetings of the Dikaiopolitan assembly in which 
the reconciliation was discussed. It remains, therefore, an open question whether the arbitration 
committee as a whole was composed of Dikaiopolitans, foreigners, or a combination of the two.
The second of the five assembly decrees (ll. 5-27) contains regulations concerning the 
swearing of the oath of reconciliation. It also makes provision for the recording of « all the 
oaths and pledges (πιστώματα) ». This formulation shows that the reconciliation required 
citizens, not only to swear the oath, but also to provide separate « pledges » to their fellow 
citizens. This second decree also makes King Perdikkas « witness and guarantor » of the oaths 
and pledges. 
The third assembly decree (ll. 27-45) makes the interesting stipulations concerning 
outstanding legal suits which arose before Gorgythos’ archonship, almost certainly the 
current archonship, which are discussed in section 3 below. The fourth and fifth decrees of the 
assembly (ll. 45-52 and ll. 52-61 respectively) make provision for certain named individuals 
to participate in the reconciliation, probably all at a later stage than the rest of the citizen-body. 
There follows (ll. 61-67) a report that the oaths, pledges and « exclusions » (prohibitions 
on prosecuting certain legal suits) took place for all except Daphnon and Kephisodoros ; 
these men, who were presumably prominent participants in the stasis, were to be allowed to 
participate in the oaths and pledges only if they brought and underwent legal proceedings and 
were acquitted. The final part of the document (ll. 67-105) contains the oath to be sworn by all 
citizens, whose contents are discussed in detail in the section b.
The document gives only a vague idea of the nature of the recent stasis. There were 
clearly two factions, one in exile, led by Demarchos, and one in the city, led by Xenophon. The 
wider diplomatic situation during Perdikkas’ reign was very probably a factor in causing the 
stasis : as Voutiras plausibly emphasises, it is very probable that the simultaneous influence of 
strong competing external powers was an enabling factor for the stasis 9. Significantly, Dikaia 
was on the margins of both Macedonian and Chalkidian influence, and Athens was a third 
influential power active in the region in the 360s BC 10. Voutiras and Sismanides even think 
that this consideration makes it possible to identify a precise context for this text 11. They 
think that Dikaia was part of the territory controlled by the Macedonian pretender Pausanias 
after he was « driven out of Macedonia » by the Athenian Iphikrates in autumn 368 BC 12. 
They argue that Pausanias was driven out of that territory, including Dikaia, when Timotheos, 
9. On the connection between this phenomenon and stasis, see e. ruschenbusch, Untersuchungen zu Staat 
und Politik in Griechenland vom 7-4 Jh. v. Chr., Bamberg 1978, p. 29-34 ; h.-j. gehrKe, Stasis : Untersuchungen 
zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Munich 1985, ch. 2.
10. For the narrative, see j. hesKel, The North Aegean Wars, 371-360 B.C., Stuttgart 1997.
11. e. Voutiras, K. sismanides, Δικαιπολιτών συναλλαγαί, p. 263-4 ; compare e. Voutiras, « La 
réconciliation des Dikaiopolites », p. 783-785.
12. See Aeschin. II, On the False Embassy, 27-29.
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allied with Perdikkas III, attacked Chalkidike in 364 BC 13. On that basis, they suggest that 
this reconciliation involved the return of pro-Perdikkas exiles to Dikaia after the expulsion 
of Pausanias from the area. The two factions named in this document were then an exiled 
pro-Perdikkas faction and an incumbent pro-Pausanias faction.
That reconstruction is plausible, but it has the weakness that it requires that Perdikkas 
tolerated the continued citizenship in Dikaia of at least some recent partisans of one of his 
most significant opponents, Pausanias, on equal terms with his own partisans, the restored 
exiles. Such even-handedness towards two factions might be easier to explain in a scenario in 
which Perdikkas made a change of direction in his diplomatic policy : for example, when he 
established more favourable relations with the Athenians in 365 or early 364 BC 14, or on the 
occasion of a rapprochement with the Chalkidian League at a later point in the 360s. In such 
circumstances, if Dikaia was already under his control or passed into his control as a result of a 
shift of allegiance, Perdikkas would have had a much clearer incentive to tolerate or encourage 
a reconciliation settlement which gave equal status to two factions, both partisans of his new 
diplomatic and military partner 15 and his own partisans.
It is probably best, therefore, to leave open the question of the precise context of this 
settlement within Perdikkas’ reign, 365-359 BC. Indeed, even if the stasis was most likely 
connected to the wider diplomatic situation, it is difficult to exclude entirely the possibility that 
the stasis which led to the exiling of Demarchos and his group was a purely or mainly local 
affair. In that case, Perdikkas would have been chosen as guarantor of the settlement because 
he was viewed as a relatively disinterested enforcer of the peace. The striking promise in the 
oath not to admit foreigners to the detriment of the commonwealth or of individuals (ll. 69-70) 
could relate, for example, to the settling of people of Macedonian origin in Dikaia, or the 
extension of citizenship to them 16. Alternatively, it could indicate, for example, that the stasis 
was a result of a disputed union or sympoliteia with another city, supported by one faction but 
opposed by another : there could have been a group in Dikaia keen on union in a sympoliteia 
or similar arrangement with another polis, which would have involved granting Dikaiopolitan 
citizenship to citizens of the other state, who were perceived as « foreigners » by opponents of the 
union 17. However, it is also quite possible that this clause refers only to the admission of transient 
foreigners, such as mercenaries, a common feature of civic unrest of many different kinds.
13. Compare Diod. Sic. XV.81.6
14. See Aeschin. II, On the False Embassy, 29-30 ; Dem. II, Second Olynthiac, 14, with scholion ; j. hesKel, 
The North Aegean Wars, p. 31-36.
15. Note, for example, that the existence of pro-Athenian Dikaiopolitans can be inferred from the fact that Dikaia 
features on the founding stele of the Second Athenian Confederacy : rhodes-osborne, GHI 22 (378/7 BC), l. 105.
16. m.b. hatzopoulos (BE 2008, no. 339) suggests that the presence of an Argaios among the leading 
political figures named in the document (l. 46), a clearly Macedonian name among Eretrian names, supports this 
kind of view.
17. Compare the attitude of Corinthian oligarchs to the « union » of Corinth and Argos in the 390s BC, as 
reported in Xen., Hell. IV.4.6 : the Corinthian oligarchs thought that they had less power than « metics » in the 
new system.
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3. – RETROSPECTIVE JUSTICE AT DIKAIA  :  
A DISTINCTIVE APPROACH AMONG KNOWN BIPARTISAN POST-STASIS 
RECONCILIATION SETTLEMENTS OUTSIDE ATHENS
As recorded in the third assembly decree in the Dikaiopolitan settlement, the arbitrators 
at Dikaia recommended a partial amnesty regarding the events of the stasis (ll. 27-45). Rather 
than engaging in litigation and retribution, citizens were to be obliged to agree to forget about 
most past wrongs, in the interests of future stability. This was made a solemn civic duty 18. 
However, the arbitrators did allow a measure of retrospective justice and enforcement of law : 
before the amnesty came into force, outstanding murder suits which had arisen 19 before the 
current (Gorgythos’) archonship could be brought on a single day, the fifth day from the end of 
the month of Daphnephorion, in Gorgythos’ archonship (ll. 28-30). If anyone did not prosecute 
a relevant suit on that occasion, the relevant matters were to be « excluded » (ἀπόκλετα) for 
him : he was not to be allowed to prosecute the suit on another occasion. It is hard to doubt 
that the murder suits in question, which had arisen before Gorgythos’ archonship, included 
some concerning murders during the stasis : it is made clear that if the factions have any other 
grievance against one another (εἰ δέ τι ἄλ̣λ̣ο ἐγκαλοῦσι), prosecution is barred (ll. 36-41).
The decision to allow some controversial δίκαι makes the Dikaiopolitan approach to 
retrospective justice quite distinctive when compared with that of other known bipartisan 
post-stasis settlements from Classical and Hellenistic poleis other than Athens. In partisan 
Greek post-stasis settlements, as in many modern partisan settlements after civil war 20, the 
victorious faction tended to assign responsibility to its defeated enemies and to exact judicial 
retribution from them 21. By contrast, in bipartisan post-stasis settlements comparable with 
the Dikaiopolitan settlement, citizens did not tend to favour strict retrospective justice. Nor 
did they favour the kind of reconciliation characteristic of a modern Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission on the South African model : frank, open-ended discussion of past events between 
perpetrators and victims, without the looming prospect of retrospective punishment. Rather, 
18. Compare a. chaniotis, « Normen stärker als Emotionen ? Der kulturhistorische Kontext der griechischen 
Amnestie » in K. harter-uibopuu and f. mitthof eds., Vergeben und Vergessen ? Amnestie in der Antike. Akten des 
ersten Wiener Kolloquiums zur Antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Wien, 27.-28.10.2008, Vienna 2013, p. 47-70, at p. 64-65.
19. This clause presumably covered all murder suits relating to events which happened before Gorgythos’ 
archonship.
20. See, for example, r. Voglis, « Between Negation and Self-Negation : Political Prisoners in Greece, 
1945-1950 » in m. mazower ed., After the War Was Over : Reconstructing the State, Family and Nation in Greece, 
1944-1960, Princeton, p. 73-91 ; or m. Vincent, « Expiation as Performative Rhetoric in National Catholicism : 
The Politics of Gesture in Post-Civil War Spain », Past and Present 203, suppl. 4, 2009, p. 235-256.
21. The best documented example is Athens after 411 BC : see a. dössel, Die Beilegung..., p. 55-88. Compare 
the practice of punishing alleged tyrants after their overthrow (see, for example, rhodes-osborne GHI 83, from 
later fourth-century BC Eresos). Note also the hypothetical proposals for treatment of the losing faction in stasis in 
the anti-tyranny law from third-century BC Ilion (I.Ilion 25), esp. ll. 53-130.
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there was a general tendency to concentrate on the present and the future : in particular, on the 
restoration of civic institutions, the establishment of consensus about property rights 22 and the 
cultivation of civic concord (ὁμόνοια).
The main concern in such settlements was often to restore the situation which existed 
before the occurrence of triggers of the breakdown of civic order, or to resolve or judge 
legal cases as they stood before those triggers. It was usually not even part of the exercise 
of reconciliation to delve into difficult questions about personal responsibility for offences 
connected with the outbreak and perpetuation of civic divisions and unrest, and suitable 
punishments for those judged responsible. Indeed, bipartisan reconciliation settlements often 
involved a comprehensive or very wide-ranging amnesty concerning recent events.
A post-stasis amnesty could be explicitly universal and unconditional in its application. 
For example, a third-century BC 23 decree of reconciliation from Arcadian Alipheira in the 
Peloponnese establishes general immunity from prosecution for all citizens concerning all 
offences relating to a recent period of foreign occupation and unrest, without providing for 
a prior period of arbitration or litigation to address those offences. The fact that this decree 
uses the word μ̣ί̣ασμα to refer to the crimes whose prosecution is forbidden suggests that even 
murder charges were forbidden by this amnesty 24.
The Alipheira settlement can be compared 25 with another Peloponnesian example in 
which the wide extent of an amnesty was explicitly stressed, a fourth-century BC text from 
Elis 26. This document emphasises the wide scope of its amnesty, which may have been actual 
or potential 27, by including the specification that a citizen protected by it is to be allowed to 
resume citizenship without penalty « even if he has exiled others ».
22. On this, see especially r. lonis, « La réintégration des exilés politiques en Grèce : le problème des biens » 
in p. gouKowsKy, cl. brixhe eds., Hellènika symmikta : histoire, archéologie, épigraphie, Nancy 1991, p. 91-109.
23. This text, IPArk 24, probably dates to 273 BC : g. thür, h. täuber, Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der 
griechischen Poleis : Arkadien, Vienna 1994, p. 279, discussing earlier bibliography.
24. See IPArk 24, ll. 4-8 ; cf. g.j. te riele, « Le Grand Apaisement d’Alipheira », RA N.S. 1967, part II, 
p. 207-224, at p. 216 ; a. dössel, Die Beilegung..., p. 226, with n. 10. 
25. It is also possible to compare the unconditional amnesty which was an explicit requirement of Polyperchon’s 
edict of 319 BC ordering the restoration to their home cities of exiles who had been expelled by Macedonian generals 
since Alexander (Diod. Sic. XVIII.56.4-5) : no grudge-bearing or trials would be allowed concerning the behaviour 
of these individuals before or during their exile. Even suits regarding violence committed during stasis connected 
with relevant exiles’ expulsion were presumably barred by this regulation. Those exiled in accordance with law for 
murder or impiety, and certain named political factions, could not, however, benefit from the edict.
26. s. minon, Les inscriptions éléennes dialectales (VIe-IIe siècle avant J.-C.), two volumes, Geneva 2007, 
no. 30 ; for discussion of different views about dating, see minon’s discussion on p. 197-198.
27. This text first protects the offspring of certain citizens from exile and stipulates exile against any citizen 
who expels any one of them (ll. 1-6). It then states (ll. 6-8) that « it is permitted for anyone who wishes, even 
if he has sent others into exile (see S. minon, Les inscriptions éléennes, p. 203-205, for the interpretation of 
the qualification καί κα φυγαδεύαντι), to return and to be immune from prosecution » for offences committed 
after the archonship of Pyrrhon. Some have thought that ll. 6-8 establish a general amnesty relevant to current 
circumstances, inviting existing exiles to return with impunity (h. swoboda, RE V, 2046 ; a. passerini, « Riforme 
sociali e divisioni di beni nella Grecia del IV secolo a. C. », Athenaeum 8, 1930, p. 273-98, p. 284-5 ; j. seibert, Die 
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Among those bipartisan post-stasis settlements preserved in inscribed form which 
were clearly not merely hypothetical, the Alipheira settlement is distinctive in making 
its wide-ranging amnesty very explicit. However, comparably wide-ranging amnesties 
were probably also established in other known cases. In a settlement from Tegea dating to 
c. 324 BC. 28, by which some exiles were reintegrated into the polis, complex provisions were 
made for litigation concerning property rights in the reunited polis, a contentious matter due to 
the return of exiles whose property had been confiscated. Property disputes were to be judged 
by a temporary foreign court during a period of sixty days. Mantineia was then to serve as a 
substitute for the temporary foreign court for cases arising from the arrival of late returnees 29 
Although extensive litigation was clearly anticipated concerning property disputes, there was 
apparently no question of allowing or holding trials aimed at attributing responsibility for 
involvement in past unrest and exilings and punishing those found responsible.
The Tegeate civic oath, to be sworn by the already incumbent citizens, even includes a 
general promise not to bear grudges against any one of the returning exiles (οὐ μνασικακήσω 
τῶννυ οὐ̣δε̣ν[ί]) 30, which probably represented a wide-ranging promise not to engage in any 
extra-judicial or judicial retribution against them 31. Admittedly, this oath clause would not in 
itself have created a comprehensive amnesty : it does not in itself rule out prosecutions by 
politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte : von den Anfängen bis zur Unterwerfung 
durch die Römer, Darmstadt 1979, p. 150 ; h.-j. gehrKe, Stasis..., p. 56 ; S. minon, Les inscriptions éléennes..., 
p. 206). However, considering what precedes in the text, ll. 6-8 are probably better interpreted as establishing a 
potential future amnesty enabling the return to the polis only of the particular citizens protected from expulsion 
in ll. 1-6, in the event that they are expelled contrary to this law, even if they themselves have exiled others 
(compare e. szanto, « Bronzeinschrift von Olympia », ÖJh 1, 1898, p. 197-212, p. 203-204 ; o.a. danielsson, 
« Zu Griechischen Inschriften », Eranos 3.4, 1899, p. 129-48, p. 139-140 ; t. reinach, « Inscriptions grecques », 
REG 16, 1903, p. 180-192, p. 188).
28. For discussion of the dating, see i. worthington, « The Date of the Tegea Decree (Tod ii 202) : A 
Response to the Diagramma of Alexander III or of Polyperchon », AHB 7, 1993, p. 59-64 ; compare a. benciVenni, 
Progetti di riforme costituzionali nelle epigrafi greche dei secoli IV-II a.c., Bologna 2003, p. 86-93 ; s. dimitrieV, 
« Alexander’s Exiles Decree », Klio 86, 2004, p. 348-81, at p. 351-4.
29. rhodes-osborne, GHI 101, ll. 24-37. 
30. rhodes-osborne, GHI 101, ll. 59-60.
31. Carawan has recently argued for an alternative interpretation. In accordance with his more general ideas 
about the meaning of μὴ μνησικακεῖν, he argues that the incumbent Tegeates’ pledge « not to bear grudges » 
represented only a promise not to engage in out-of-court retribution or to seek to re-open in court those particular 
disputes which had been explicitly and formally resolved through this settlement. See e. carawan, « The Athenian 
Amnesty and the Scrutiny of the Laws », JHS 122, 2002, p. 6-7 ; for his underlying broader argument, see p. 4-12 
of that article and his Rhetoric and the Law of Draco, Oxford 1998, p. 129-132. It is true that the commitment « not 
to bear grudges » might well have been understood to be limited to those past events connected, at least remotely, 
with the exiles’ expulsion and period of exile. It seems unlikely, however, that it was understood to be restricted any 
further than that in scope. If the pledge was intended primarily to confirm recent judicial decisions about property, 
it would be surprising that there is no reference in the wider oath to the regulations about property disputes and 
associated litigation. Moreover, an oath primarily intended to confirm property settlements would surely have 
been sworn by all involved, not simply by the incumbent citizens. It is far more likely that the primary function 
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the returned exiles against their expellers. It seems quite likely, however, that this oath by 
the incumbent citizens would have been accompanied, in a lost part of the settlement, by a 
mirroring oath by the returned exiles, also ruling out controversial retrospective litigation.
A comparison can be made with a literary account : Xenophon’s description of stasis and 
reconciliation in Peloponnesian Phlius in the early fourth century BC. Xenophon reports that, 
when some Phliasian exiles were reintegrated into Phlius in 384 BC, to live alongside their 
erstwhile opponents in a bipartisan new regime, it was decided that disputes relating to the 
returned exiles’ property would be judged by a court, a matter which later became a focus of 
much controversy 32. Xenophon makes no suggestion that questions of retrospective justice 
were to be addressed, by a court or in any other way. Retrospective justice did become relevant 
after the conclusion of the ensuing stasis in Phlius, when King Agesilaos of Sparta appointed 
a post-stasis commission to determine use of the death penalty and a future constitution. That 
commission was, however, not a truly bipartisan one : Agesilaos favoured his partisans with 
disproportionate representation, giving equal representation on the commission to the majority, 
who had remained in the city, and to the far smaller group of devoted pro-Spartans who had 
fled into exile 33.
There are many other examples of inscribed bipartisan reconciliation in which explicit 
language about amnesty and forgetting of wrongs is absent, but there are no signs of moves 
to allow or pursue retrospective justice concerning the events of a stasis. For example, an 
inscribed bipartisan post-stasis reconciliation settlement from Mytilene, dating to c. 334 BC 
or later 34, prescribes that an arbitration committee should be formed, composed of ten citizens 
from each of the two recent factions, exiles and incumbent citizens. However, it makes that 
committee responsible only for addressing questions about future civic organisation : it is 
to ensure that nothing is detrimental to the interests of either side and to resolve property 
disputes resulting from the reconciliation, with the aim that all will live in accordance with 
the settlement 35. The description of the board’s responsibilities suggests that past events and 
offences were outside its remit. The adjudication of disputed matters was intended to prepare 
the way for renewed harmony and religious unity, in the form of collective rituals and prayers 
for the well-being of all citizens 36.
of the oath was to provide a wide-ranging guarantee of security to the returning exiles : the exiles were to enjoy 
unchallenged civic rights, not suffering any further retribution for whatever had caused their original exile. For these 
objections, compare c.j. joyce, « The Athenian Amnesty and Scrutiny of 403 », CQ 58, 2008, p. 507-518, at p. 512.
32. Xen., Hell. V.2.10 ; 3.10.
33. Xen., Hell. V.3.25 ; p. cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, London 1987, p. 265-266.
34. rhodes-osborne, GHI 85B. For discussion of dating, see p. brun, « Les exilés politiques en Grèce : 
l’exemple de Lesbos », Ktema 13, 1988, p. 255-256 ; i. worthington, « Alexander the Great and the Date of the 
Mytilene Decree », ZPE 83, 1990, p. 194-214 ; a. benciVenni, Progetti di riforme..., p. 45-46 ; a. dössel, Die 
Beilegung..., p. 159, 172, 177-178 ; s. dimitrieV, « Alexander’s Exiles Decree », p. 357-360.
35. rhodes-osborne, GHI 85B, ll. 21-38.
36. rhodes-osborne, GHI 85B, ll. 38-49.
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In a similar way, the fourth century or third century document of reconciliation from 
Nakone which features among the Entella tablets 37, brokered by conciliators from Egesta, 
contains much rhetoric about civic unity and friendship, but no reference to retrospective 
justice concerning violence and other offences committed during the recent stasis. Either the 
conciliators from Egesta did not tackle that question, or the citizens of Nakone declined to 
publish and record for posterity any indication that their reconciliation settlement had involved 
any settling of scores and attribution of personal responsibility for stasis.
The Tegeate and Nakonian settlements were not the only cases resulting in inscribed 
settlements in which foreigners were called in to achieve a bipartisan reconciliation of a 
citizen-body after stasis or acute divisions. Indeed, as Crowther has shown in his studies of the 
« foreign judges » phenomenon, Hellenistic poleis tended to summon judges from a friendly 
polis when internal disputes between citizens proved intractable 38. They probably often did so 
in order to pre-empt unrest. However, there are some cases in which foreign judges intervened 
after bouts of unrest (ταραχή) 39. Whereas the envoys from Egesta in Nakone appear to 
have drawn up a whole post-stasis settlement, the remit of most other foreign judges and 
arbitrators summoned after unrest appears to have been comparatively limited : most seem to 
have been charged specifically with resolving the contractual disputes, presumably normally 
connected with credit and debt, which were at the root of the unrest 40. The scope of the typical 
responsibilities of foreign judges or arbitrators of this type did not usually extend to examining, 
and assigning responsibility for, actions committed after disagreements about these contracts 
led to the breakdown or abuse of civic procedures : for example, controversial prosecutions, 
exilings or confiscations or property, violence against fellow citizens, or refusals to fulfil civic 
obligations or to comply with judicial decisions. Nor is there any indication in the relevant 
texts that domestic courts attempted to assign responsibility to individuals, or impose penalties 
on them, in relation to those actions. Furthermore, even in exercising the function of resolving 
contractual disputes, relevant foreign judges and arbitrators were expected to tread carefully : 
arbitration was much preferred to formal judgement according to the laws 41. 
37. SEG 30.1119, with SEG 51.1185.
38. See c.V. crowther, « Iasos in the Second Century BC : Foreign Judges from Priene », BICS 40, 1995, 
p. 91-138 ; id., « I.Priene 8 and the History of Priene in the Early Hellenistic Period », Chiron 26, 1996, p. 195-250.
39. IG IX 2 1230 (a foreign judge in Phalanna : a preceding ταράχη is mentioned in l. 2 ; the judge is praised 
in l. 12 for removing στάσις) ; IG XII 5 7 (a text probably relating to the intervention of foreign judges in Ios : 
a preceding ταραχή is mentioned in l. 2) ; IG XII 5 1065 (intervention of foreign judges in Karthaia on Keos : a 
reference to a preceding ταραχή is restored in l. 2) ; I.Iasos 82, ll. 29-64 (intervention of Iasian judges in Kalymna : 
the fear of « greater ταραχή’ in l. 42 suggests that there had already been some unrest) ; IC I xix 3 (intervention of 
judges from Knossos and Lyttos in Malla, after ταραχή and division concerning property and contracts, ll. 17-19).
40. Note, for example, IG IX 2 1230, ll. 3-13. 
41. Cf. c.V. crowther, « Iasos in the Second Century BC », p. 92 ; d. roebucK, Ancient Greek Arbitration, 
Oxford 2001, p. 24-25, 282 ; a. dössel, Die Beilegung..., p. 256, 262-263.
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Admittedly, there are some known cases in which foreign judges adjudicated in legal 
cases whose focus was not simply the resolution of disputed private contracts 42. That kind 
of jurisdiction would often have involved assigning personal responsibility for wrongdoing. 
However, there is no indication in most cases that the judges in question were summoned after a 
full-scale stasis or breakdown of civic institutions comparable to those considered here, rather 
than to solve an impasse in civic politics and pre-empt civil unrest. The one possible exception 
is that a Prienian decree reports that Prienian foreign judges in Alexandria Troas judged all 
the cases concerning unlawful and violent actions (τὰς δίκας ... ἁπάσας ἔκριναν τάς τε 
τῶμ παρανόμων καὶ τὰς τὼμ βιαίων) 43. The forceful language about « lawlessness » 44 and 
violence makes it quite conceivable that the relevant actions took place in the course of civil 
unrest, rather than routine civic life, which might explain why the citizens of Alexandria Troas 
found it necessary to invite foreign judges. This situation might, therefore, represent a rare 
parallel to the Dikaiopolitan case : another example of strict, public, recorded retrospective 
justice in the course of a bipartisan reconciliation after stasis.
4. – THE PROBLEM RAISED BY SECTION 3
The evidence considered in section 3 results in a problem which requires explanation : 
why did the Dikaiopolitans assent to the proposal for a measure of retrospective justice 
concerning killings during stasis, when many other cities preferred very wide-ranging amnesty 
in similar circumstances ? Someone might object that this problem is not very acute, because 
the Dikaiopolitans allowed murder trials on only one specified day. Arguably, however, this 
makes the problem even more pressing : the restriction of suits to one day suggests that the 
arbitrators were themselves conscious of a danger that allowing murder suits could re-inflame 
smouldering tensions, by giving a space for formal levelling of controversial attributions of 
responsibility for stasis deaths. This might unleash renewed discord and retribution.
Consciousness of such a danger was probably also a significant reason why the arbitrators 
at Dikaia also stipulated particularly heavy penalties for anyone who subsequently brought 
or heard a murder case : exile for the litigant and disenfranchisement for the magistrate, as 
opposed to disenfranchisement for the litigant and confiscation of property for the magistrate if 
42. These have been collected by c.V. crowther : see I.Priene 44, ll. 17-18 (judgement by judges from 
Priene in Alexandria Troas) ; I.Priene 50, ll. 6-7 (a judge from Priene in Erythrai) ; BCH 95, 1971, 554-9, ll. 
11-12 (judges from Herakleia Trachinia in Demetrias) ; SEG 27.226, ll. 5-9 (judges from Metropolis in Crannon) ; 
JHS 33, 1913, 332-7, no. 16, ll. 7-8 (judges from Metropolis in Phalanna) ; IG XII 2 530, esp. ll. 1-3 (judges from 
Eresos in an unknown city).
43. I.Priene 44, ll. 17-18.
44. Elsewhere in Hellenistic Prienian epigraphy, compare the use of such language in relation to severe 
disorder at I.Priene 17, ll. 7, 9, 17-18.
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any suit was successfully brought concerning any of the other excluded matters. The fact that 
the arbitrators and the Dikaiopolitans allowed murder suits, despite some trepidation about the 
possible consequences, demands some explanation.
5. – A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DISTINCTIVE DIKAIOPOLITAN 
APPROACH TO RETROSPECTIVE JUSTICE  : IMITATION OF THE ATHENIAN 
RECONCILIATION OF 403 BC
One possible solution to the problem raised in the previous section is that the Dikaiopolitans 
and their arbitrators were consciously imitating the Athenian reconciliation settlement of 403. 
Indeed, Voutiras argues strongly for the importance of the Athenian example as a model for 
the Dikaiopolitan settlement as a whole 45. For example, the fact that certain named individuals, 
probably factional ringleaders, were obliged to undergo legal proceedings in accordance with 
the law (ll. 61-7) 46 before resuming citizenship recalls the situation in Athens after the fall of 
the Thirty Tyrants in 403 BC, when members of the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven and the rulers 
in the Piraeus were allowed to resume Athenian citizenship only if they underwent a scrutiny 
and were judged suitable 47.
With respect to murder suits, the relevant consideration is that the scholarly orthodoxy is 
that the Athenian amnesty of 403 BC, comprising both the initial agreement and subsequent 
legal rules 48, permitted certain murder suits, suits for murder « with one’s own hand », relating 
to the events of the stasis 49. If this orthodoxy is correct, the Athenian case would be an important 
parallel for the permitting of murder suits at Dikaia, but only a partial one. Even in that case, 
the Dikaiopolitan regulations would be distinctive, and distinctively bold : the Dikaiopolitans 
permitted prosecution of previous murder cases of all kinds, not simply cases of murder « with 
one’s own hand ».
45. See, for example, e. Voutiras, K. sismanides, Δικαιπολιτών συναλλαγαί, p. 266 ; e. Voutiras, « La 
réconciliation des Dikaiopolites », p. 781 ; also the arguments of e. Voutiras’ forthcoming monograph on the 
Dikaiopolitan inscription.
46. Presumably, in this case, it was not only offences of homicide which were envisaged.
47. e. Voutiras, K. sismanides, Δικαιπολιτών συναλλαγαί, p. 266 ; and e. Voutiras, « La réconciliation 
des Dikaiopolites », p. 781, comparing [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.6.
48. The initial agreement was reinforced by a subsequent specific rule that the laws could be applied only 
« from Eukleides archonship » ; the laws could be applied only in connection with events occurring in or after 403/2 
(see e. carawan, « The Athenian Amnesty », p. 16-17 ; id., « Amnesty and Accountings for the Thirty », CQ 56, 
2006, p. 57-76, at p. 69).
49. See, for example, p. cloché, La restauration démocratique à Athènes en 403 avant J.-C., Paris 1915, 
p. 59-60 ; r.j. bonner, « Note on Aristotle Constitution of Athens XXXIX.5 », CPh 19, 1924, p. 175-176 ; 
p.j. rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford 1981, p. 468 ; e. carawan, « The 
Athenian Amnesty », p. 8-9 ; id., « Amnesty and Accountings... », p. 69-70 ; id., « Paragraphe and the Merits », 
GRBS 51, 2011, p. 254-295, at p. 271-272 ; a. dössel, Die Beilegung..., p. 99-100, 215 ; s.j. todd, A Commentary 
on Lysias, Speeches 1-11, Oxford 2007, p. 639, with n. 55.
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Importantly, the Dikaiopolitans thereby opened up the complex issue of indirect 
responsibility for, or complicity in, killings during stasis : in particular, the question whether 
factional magistrates or conspirators-in-chief who had ordered or authorised killings by their 
underlings, or underlings who had facilitated but not carried out killings, were guilty of 
murder. Such questions could be deeply contentious, and wide open to partisan interpretation 
or distortion. For example, in the Hellenistic anti-tyranny law from Ilion, it was stated that 
anyone who voted under a non-democratic regime for a death penalty which was subsequently 
carried out would be considered a murderer 50. The contentious nature of the question meant 
that a large volume of prosecutions could be expected in any post-stasis situation if all possible 
murder suits were allowed : for example, Carawan suggests that, if citizens had been permitted 
to bring all potential murder suits after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens in 403 BC, an 
« avalanche of litigation » would have followed 51. The Dikaiopolitans, unlike the Athenians, 
were prepared to take this risk, something which requires a special explanation.
There is also another reason why imitation of Athens is not entirely satisfactory as a sole 
explanation for the Dikaiopolitans’ approach to murder suits : as I hope to argue more fully 
elsewhere, the argument that the Athenian amnesty of 403 BC was qualified in such a way as 
to allow certain murder suits is not particularly secure. That argument rests on an interpretation 
of the summary of the 403 BC settlement in chapter 39 of the Athenaion Politeia which has 
significant problems.
In setting out the terms of the settlement brokered between the factions in his chapter 39, 
Ps.-Aristotle first describes in detail the regulations for the separation of the Athenian citizen 
body into two separate entities, an autonomous oligarchic enclave in Eleusis and the main 
Athenian civic community in the city itself. Sections 1-5 contain precise regulations which 
are of concern to both of the new entities, especially regulations concerning relations between 
them and the scope and boundaries of the autonomy of the new Eleusis community. There 
is then the corrupt sentence τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, εἴ τίς τινα 
ΑΥΤΟΧΕΙΡΑΕΚΤΕΙΣΙΙΕΡΩΣΑΣ 52 (« murder cases were to be tried according to ancestral 
practice, if anyone ... anyone with his own hand »). Immediately after this, in section 6, the 
author then offers a description of the amnesty, beginning τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ 
πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι (« concerning past events, no-one was to be allowed to 
bear a grudge against anyone »).
50. I.Ilion 25 (Ilion, third century BC), ll. 97-9.
51. e. carawan, Rhetoric..., p. 127.
52. The papyrus has ΑΥΤΟΧΙΡΑΕΚΤΙΣΙΟΤΡΩΣΑΣ, with an epsilon added above the first iota, an 
epsilon inserted above the second iota and the οτ crossed out, with ιε inserted above (p.j. rhodes, Commentary on 
the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, p. 468).
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The most common interpretation is that the corrupt line about murder trials states an 
exception from the apparently universal amnesty stated in the following sentence. Agreement 
on this interpretation of the sense had led to acceptance of the restoration εἴ τίς τινα αὐτοχειρίᾳ 
ἔκτεινεν ἢ ἔτρωσεν (« if anyone killed or wounded anyone with his own hand »), with aorist 
indicatives, in the corrupt part.
This dominant interpretation of the sense of the lines is, however, hard to reconcile with the 
actual order and wording of the surviving text, even allowing for compression of the original 
document which Ps.-Aristotle was using. The sentence about the amnesty begins with the genitive 
τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων (« concerning past events ») which seems quite clearly to mark a shift 
to a new subject : attention turns away from issues of present and future organisation and towards 
past events. In this light, it would be very strange if the previous sentence was already concerned 
with past wrongs. Indeed, that interpretation requires that the previous sentence states a technical 
exception from an amnesty which has not even yet been mentioned.
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the dominant interpretation with the way in which 
the amnesty itself is presented : as an unconditional ban on retribution for past wrongs. The 
emphatic juxtaposition of μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα suggests a universal arrangement, with no 
exceptions. In addition, the blanket statement that the amnesty concerns « past events » (τῶν 
δὲ παρεληλυθότων) strongly suggests universality. The dominant interpretation would be 
more attractive if the sentence about the amnesty opened « concerning other past events... » or 
« otherwise, concerning past events... » 53.
Since no such qualification features in the text, it seems much more consistent with the 
preserved words to suppose that the corrupt sentence is making some other stipulation about 
murder trials, rather than permitting retrospective murder trials irrespective of the amnesty. 
The plausibility of one possible alternative is defended in the appendix to this article : the 
sentence about murder trials could represent a final item in the regulations concerning the 
new community at Eleusis and its relations with the main civic community. Other alternatives 
might also be possible. The Athenian amnesty may well, therefore, have been even more 
ambitiously wide-ranging than commonly thought, not even allowing suits for murder « with 
one’s own hand ».
The considerations raised in this section make it necessary to look beyond imitation of 
Athens in order to solve the problem of why the Dikaiopolitan settlement allowed post-stasis 
murder suits to be brought. The Dikaiopolitans were certainly bolder than the Athenians 
concerning murder suits, and quite possibly a great deal bolder. The best approach to explaining 
the distinctive Dikaiopolitan arrangement may be to consider in more detail the nature of the 
Dikaiopolitan settlement itself, especially the ideas and values underpinning it.
53. Compare m. stahl, « Nachträgliches über athenische Amnestiebeschlüsse », RhM 46, 1891, p. 481-487, 
at p. 485, with n. 2 ; t. thalheim, « Zu Aristoteles’ Αθηναίων Πολιτεία », BPW 29, 1909, p. 702-703, at p. 703.
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6. – AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE DIKAIOPOLITAN APPROACH TO 
RETROSPECTIVE JUSTICE : THE CIVIC VALUES OF THE « CITY OF JUSTICE »
The tendency of other bipartisan reconciliation settlements to steer away from strict 
retrospective justice can be seen to be grounded in ideas about the nature of the good polis, and 
thus of good reconciliation. Many bipartisan reconciliation settlements and honorary decrees 
for foreign arbitrators and judges place stress on concord (ὁμόνοια) 54, the common good 
of the city and all its citizens 55, and the promotion of mutual good will and other positive, 
unifying emotions among citizens 56. Similarly, at Athens after the Thirty Tyrants, there was 
much emphasis on restored civic fraternity, collective virtue and concord 57.
These values were expressed in particularly radical form in the fourth century or third 
century BC bipartisan reconciliation from Sicilian Nakone 58. In that case, the arbitrators from 
Egesta proposed measures intended to restore or build a very substantial level of solidarity 
among the citizens of Nakone. The main measure they proposed was the formation of new 
civic groups which would cut across the recent factions : each was to consist of one member 
from each of the two factions and three neutral citizens 59. These new groups were subsequently 
to participate together in an annual festival of concord (ὁμόνοια) 60. This measure was 
presumably designed to promote trust and solidarity among different citizens after their recent 
experience of discord 61. The text itself offers (ll. 19-21) a very idealistic description of the 
purpose of the « brother-making » : the members of these new groups were to be « chosen 
brothers, united in concord with one another with all justice and friendship » (ἀδελφοὶ αἱρετοὶ 
ὁμονοοῦντες ἀλ̣λ̣άλ̣οις μετὰ πάσας δικαιότατος καὶ φιλίας).
It is possible to understand why citizens committed to such strong values of fraternity, 
unanimity and concord would often have taken the weighty decision to severely restrict 
retrospective justice in a post-stasis context through a very wide-ranging amnesty. Such a 
decision would surely often have been difficult in itself : it involved denying aggrieved citizens 
54. See, for example, IG XII 5 1065, ll. 3-4.
55. See, for example, rhodes-osborne, GHI 85B, ll. 39-42. In general, compare A. dössel, Die Beilegung..., 
e.g. p. 291.
56. See, for example, rhodes-osborne, GHI 85A (Mytilene, c. 334 or later), ll. 2-4. On the attempt in such 
regulations to control or transform citizens’ emotions, see a. chaniotis, « Normen stärker als Emotionen ? ».
57. See, for example, Xen. Hell. V.4.20-2 ; Isocr. XVIII, Against Callimachus, 46 ; Dem. XX, Against 
Leptines, 11. Compare the stress on these aspects of the Athenian amnesty in n. loraux, The Divided City : 
on Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens, New York 2001 ; j. shear, Polis and Revolution : Responding to 
Oligarchy in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2011, p. 202-203.
58. SEG 30.1119, with SEG 51.1185 ; see also c. ampolo (ed.), Da un’antica città di Sicilia. I decreti di 
Entella e Nakone, Pisa 2001, Nakone text A. 
59. After all members of the two factions have been assigned, remaining neutral citizens will continue to be 
distributed until the brotherhoods each have five members.
60. SEG 30.1119, ll. 3-33.
61. Compare n. loraux, The Divided City..., esp. p. 224 ; also D. Asheri, « Formes et procédures 
de réconciliation » in F.N.F. Javier ed., Symposium 1982 : Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen 
Rechtsgeschichte, Cologne 1982, p. 135-45.
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the opportunity to seek judicial redress, even in connection with deaths of relatives. However, 
it would have been a conscientious and consistent application of strong ideals of ὁμόνοια. 
This is largely because the reverse course, allowing citizens to engage in litigation concerning 
the events of a stasis, could often easily have been perceived as giving unacceptable priority 
to the private over the public : such a course could have been perceived as offering citizens 
the opportunity to concentrate on private grievances, interests and perceived entitlements, 
even at the expense of the common good and civic stability. According to prominent Greek 
ways of thinking, it was far more important to redeem collective civic life and solidarity than 
to settle private scores. As Andocides put it in addressing the Athenians about their amnesty, 
« you preferred the salvation of the polis, rather than private retribution » (περὶ πλείονος 
ἐποιήσασθε σῴζειν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τὰς ἰδίας τιμωρίας) 62.
Some citizens committed to strong ideals of ὁμόνοια were even consciously fearful that 
strict, formal post-stasis trials might provoke renewed civic unrest. In the Hellenistic period, 
the citizens of Kalymna at one point explicitly praised Iasian foreign judges for achieving a 
settlement through persuasion, so that « the people might not be thrown into more disorder, 
with matters being judged by a vote » (ὅπως μὴ διὰ ψάφου τῶν πρα[γμά]των κρινομένων 
εἰς πλέω ταραχὰν ὁ δᾶμος [καθισ]τᾶται) 63.
Viewed against this background, the Dikaiopolitan settlement can be seen to be founded 
upon a different understanding, equally complex and coherent, of the good city and good civic 
reconciliation, far easier to reconcile with strict post-stasis justice. A complex and coherent 
vision of good civic order is most clearly expressed in the oath of reconciliation, to be sworn 
by all citizens (ll. 67-105).
Significantly, the oath begins with the promise : « I will be just in my behaviour as a 
citizen towards all » (πολιτεύσομαι ἐπίπασι δικαί<ω>ς, l. 67). It thus begins with a punning 
reference to the name of the city : literally, a promise to « be a Dikaiopolitan ». Through 
this opening, the oath immediately makes central the Dikaiopolitans’ traditional civic value 
system : it gives priority to the political principle which, as discussed in section 2 above, the 
city’s founders, possibly disgruntled exiles from Eretria, had enshrined at the heart of the 
political life of their new « City of Justice », probably around a century before.
The mere mention of justice in a bipartisan post-stasis settlement is itself striking. It was 
certainly not simply a commonplace to refer to justice in a bipartisan oath of reconciliation, 
probably because of the tensions between ideals of harmony and strict justice identified above. 
Indeed, justice is conspicuously absent from other civic oaths sworn in the course of bipartisan 
post-stasis reconciliation which survive in inscribed form, from Tegea, Telos and Itanos 64. 
62. Andoc. 1.81.
63. I.Iasos 82, ll. 39-42.
64. See rhodes-osborne, GHI 101 (Tegea, c. 324 BC), ll. 57-66 ; IG XII 4 1 132 (Telos, early Hellenistic), 
ll. 128-36 ; IC III iV 8 (Itanos, probably third century BC), ll. 9-38 (although there is no explicit reference to recent 
stasis in this Cretan text, it is very likely that the inclusion of explicit promises to refrain from various types of 
revolutionary behaviour was made necessary by recent disorder).
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Language of « justice » was normally far more straightforwardly suited to the context of 
partisan reconciliation, when the interests of the victorious party determined the public moral 
status of earlier actions. For example, in fourth-century Phlius after the capitulation of the anti-
Spartan regime, Agesilaos’ post-stasis tribunal was to decide who should live in the cityand 
who should die, according to the requirement of justice (ὅντινα τε ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ 
ὅντινα ἀποθανεῖν δίκαιον εἴη). 65
Another reason why the prominence of justice in the Dikaiopolitan oath is striking is that 
the rest of the oath and wider settlement indicate that the Dikaiopolitan ideal of justice 66 had 
a particular form. In the Nakonian case considered above, it is interesting that the concept of 
justice itself was associated with a very high level of civic integration, fraternity and concord : 
it was paired with φιλία. The notion of justice given institutional shape in the Dikaiopolitan 
reconciliation was a quite different one, suggesting a different conception of civic order. 
Citizens were not required to swear to pursue common interests or values, or to cultivate civic 
friendship : unlike in other post-stasis oaths, for example, citizens were not required to swear 
to preserve ὁμόνοια 67 or to show good will to fellow citizens. 68 Rather, citizens were required 
to promise to show less warm, more contractual attitudes towards one another : « I will give 
and receive the same good faith » (καὶ πίστιν δώσω καὶ δέξομαι τὴν αὐτήν, l. 75).
The reason for regarding this particular pledge as less warm and more contractual in this 
context is that this clause was presumably at least partly a reference to the mutual pledges 
of faith (πιστώματα) which are mentioned elsewhere in the settlement (ll. 11-12, 22) : after 
the oath, all citizens were to give verbal promises, or physical tokens, of good faith, mutual 
guarantees of security and basic trust. Citizens were thus effectively to act out a symbolic 
social contract, for mutual security, advantage and justice. It would presumably have been too 
time-consuming for each citizen to exchange pledges with every single fellow citizen. The 
procedure was probably that each citizen would give his pledge of faith to all fellow citizens 
collectively and receive in return the deposit (παραθήκη) from Apollo mentioned later in the 
oath (ll. 91-4), which would symbolise the reciprocal good faith sworn by each of his fellow 
citizens, observed and guaranteed by Apollo. 
The formal, contractual guarantees of honest, fair co-operation exchanged by the citizens 
of Dikaia are of a type essential among mainly distrustful, egoistic fellow citizens, anxious 
not to be outwitted or betrayed by their peers. They would, however, be superfluous among 
Nakone-style civic « brothers », who trust one another instinctively. In general, to make a 
65. Xen., Hell. V.3.25.
66. The vision of civic justice and order evident in this document can be confidently used as evidence for 
Dikaia’s own civic value system : whether Lykios and his fellow arbitrators were Dikaiopolitans or foreigners, they 
must have taken careful account of the assumptions and basic values of the Dikaiopolitan citizen-body, in order to 
be able to convince the Dikaiopolitan assembly to vote for their proposals.
67. Contrast IOSPE I2 401 (Chersonesos Taurica, third century BC), l. 5 ; cf. A. dössel, Die Beilegung..., 
p. 179-196. Admittedly, the cult of Homonoia is not attested before the later fourth century BC, but the concept was in 
circulation from the end of the fifth : g. thériault, Le culte d’Homonoia dans les cités grecques, Lyon 1996, p. 180.
68. Contrast rhodes-osborne, GHI 101, ll. 57-8.
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comparison with philosophy, the contractual approach to civic order evident in the Dikaiopolitan 
text chimes with the political ideas of some Classical Greek Sophists 69. Nevertheless, the close 
association made in the Dikaiopolitan text between justice and contractual good faith most 
closely recalls Roman rather than Greek philosophical ideas : compare, for example, Cicero’s 
identification of fides (« good faith ») as a « foundation of justice » (fundamentum iustitiae) in 
his De Officiis, a work which lays great stress on the importance of strict respect for property 
rights, procedures and reciprocity 70.
The other clauses of the Dikaiopolitan civic oath represent the specific requirements of the 
city’s « just » civic contract. The oath requires citizens to promise to show fairly limited forms 
of civic commitment, which leave considerable space for self-interested bargaining : it requires 
them to promise to respect fellow citizens’ basic safety, to follow established procedures and 
agreed contracts punctiliously, and to requite like with like. These promises each serve to keep 
in check and regulate, rather than to eradicate, distrust, competition and disagreement among 
Dikaiopolitan citizens.
Concern for citizens’ basic security and the integrity of procedures is evident throughout 
the oath. Citizens had to promise to respect the ancestral constitution (ll. 67-8) : they would 
abide by established, mutually accepted procedures. They then had to make the pledge not 
to admit foreigners to the city to the detriment of the Dikaiopolitan community (κοινόν) or 
of any individual (ll. 68-9) : a negative pledge not to disrupt the existing distribution of civic 
rights. There follow (ll. 70-74) similar negative pledges not to disrupt the civic contract, by 
imperilling the security of individual citizens : citizens had to promise not to bear grudges ; 
not to put anyone to death, exile anyone or confiscate anyone’s property for the sake of things 
in the past ; and not to collaborate with anyone who did bear grudges. In similar vein, they 
then had to promise (ll. 74-5) : « I will take down (others) from the altars and be taken down 
myself » (καὶ ἀπὸ τῶμ β̣ωμῶν καθελέω καὶ καθαιρεθ[ή]σομαι). The meaning was probably 
that citizens would not allow the asylum of the altars to be used to avoid punishment for 
contravening the terms of the settlement, or themselves make use of it in that way 71 : citizens 
explicitly promised not to circumvent their agreed obligations by appeal to separate religious 
norms.
69. Note Anonymus Iamblichi 6.1 DK (note also the emphasis on πίστις as a feature of the good polis in 7.1) ; 
Arist., Pol. 1280a31-1280b12 (criticising the view of the Sophist Lykophron that law is a contract). Compare also 
the argument that justice and law are products of a social contract for mutual security and advantage defended by 
Glaukon and Adeimantus in Book II of Plato’s Republic.
70. Cic., Off. I.23 ; a.a. long, « Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis » in a. laKs, m. schofield, Justice and 
Generosity : Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy, Cambridge 1995, p. 213-240. For Cicero’s 
related, more contractual view of the state as a « partnership » in his De Re Publica, see e. asmis, « The State as a 
Partnership : Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica in his work On the State », History of Political Thought 25, 2004, 
p. 569-598.
71. Alternatively, this could be a reference to a ritual of reconciliation or supplication involving the altars.
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After the requirement to give and receive the same pledge and a promise to participate 
in mutual purification, there follows a further affirmation of the inviolability of contractual 
good faith : the swearer must make an emphatic promise to honour any pledges which he 
extracted or gave (ll. 77-80). It would be very odd to include here a commitment to adhere to 
all pre-existing pledges, since those would include pledges exchanged between factionaries in 
the stasis. Such factional commitments were probably overridden by this settlement : shortly 
afterwards (ll. 82-4), the swearer promises to revoke any previous oath, in favour of this 
one. The most obvious interpretation of the promise to honour past pledges would be that it 
represents a promise to respect the pledges accompanying this settlement, but the use of the 
future tense in l. 75 suggests that those pledges had not yet been exchanged when most citizens 
swore the oath, but were to follow. The promise to honour past pledges probably, therefore, 
concerned past pledges separate from the stasis, which citizens here bound themselves to 
respect, or initial pledges at the end of the post-stasis trials on the fifth of Daphnephorion, 
which were to be followed by more general or important pledges after the oath.
The importance of contractual good faith was again stressed in the requirement that the 
swearer should promise to abide by the result of cases (δίκαι) which the polis judged (ll. 80-2). 
Moreover, the swearer was then required to pray for welfare for himself, his family and his 
property if he swore this oath faithfully and bad fortune if he perjured himself (ll. 84-91). 
He was also then required to undertake to receive the token or deposit (παραθήκη) from 
the Temple of Apollo, discussed above (ll. 91-4). No pledge goes beyond a commitment to 
exchange, and respect, contractual guarantees of co-operation.
The other key component of the Dikaiopolitan contractual model of civic order, respect 
for strict, tit-for-tat reciprocity, surfaces several times in the oath. The promise to give and 
receive « the same pledge » (l. 75) encapsulates the essence of strict reciprocity : citizens 
were to receive from their fellow citizens the precise equivalent of the good faith which they 
themselves offered. The same kind of exact equivalence of mutual concessions and guarantees 
is also evident in the nearby clauses of the oath in which the swearer promises to carry out 
and himself undergo the same kind of treatment, using the active and passive or middle of 
the same verb in order to emphasise the fairness of the exchange : « I will take down (others) 
from the altars and be taken down myself » ; and « I will give and receive purification as 
the commonwealth orders » (ll. 74-7). These sound like grudging guarantees given by 
mutually distrustful citizens. Strict reciprocity is again invoked, in a reference to possible 
tit-for-tat retribution, in the description of the role of the token from Apollo as a guarantee 
of the settlement : the swearer has to express the hope that, if he perjures himself, the god 
from whom he took the deposit should personally punish him, taking revenge for the offence 
caused, together with all the other gods (τιμωρήσειεν δὲ ὁ [θ]εὸς παρ’ οὗ ἔλαβον τὴν 
παραθήκην μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν πάντων, ll. 102-105).
The nature of the Dikaiopolitan civic value system expressed in the document offers an 
attractive solution to this article’s central problem of why the Dikaiopolitans, unlike participants 
in many other Greek bipartisan reconciliation settlements, permitted strict retrospective justice 
concerning murder. This could well have been because the Dikaiopolitans and their arbitrators 
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had a particular interest in upholding the specific type of justice emphasised in the settlement, 
involving respect for procedures, laws, agreements and strict reciprocity. To institute a 
comprehensive amnesty would have represented a severe affront to those values : it would 
have allowed citizens to avoid accounting even for killings through established procedures, 
let alone suffering tit-for-tat punishment if found guilty. The ideal of justice, understood in 
the particular way attested at Dikaia, demanded more rigorous enforcement of procedures and 
deserts. The Hellenistic Prienians recognised the connection between justice (δικαιοσύνη) 
and strict judgement of legal cases (δίκαι) : they commented that Prienian judges had « fairly 
and justly » (ἴσως καὶ δικαίως) judged cases concerning « lawless and violent actions » at 
Alexandria Troas 72. The ideal of justice favoured at Dikaia also made it legitimate for citizens 
to show, at least within limits, some of the emotions, of anger, resentment or desire for revenge, 
which bipartisan reconciliation settlements usually strongly discouraged 73.
It seems that, in the event, the Dikaiopolitans and their arbitrators were sufficiently 
committed, or sensitive, to the traditional value system of the « City of Justice » to make space 
in the settlement for a measure of retrospective justice, despite the potential dangers, and to 
prominently advertise that fact in the formal, published version of their settlement. Even at 
the risk of re-inflaming civic discord, they found it necessary to allow strict enforcement of 
law and strictly reciprocal retribution, at least in the case of the most serious stasis crime of 
murder : δίκαι (trials) could not be comprehensively ruled out at Dikaia.
There is a parallel in another quite recently published document for the kind of civic value 
system attested at Dikaia, based on concern for procedures, agreements and strict reciprocity 
rather than unconditional solidarity, giving legitimacy to a measure of retrospective justice 
after stasis. The relevant text is a reconciliation settlement from early Hellenistic Telos 74. In 
that case, the probable sequence of events was the following. The Telian δᾶμος asked the 
Coans to send arbitrators to broker a wide-ranging reconciliation settlement with dissident 
citizens 75.The text suggests that the trigger for the conflict between the Telian δᾶμος and these 
dissidents was the dissidents’ refusal to pay either two or three types of penalty : penalties 
arising from « sacred (legal) cases », « public cases » and possibly also « cases of the road » 76. 
It appears that, as a result, the incumbent democrats confiscated the dissidents’ property 77. 
This must have happened shortly before or after the dissidents were either forced out of the 
polis or fled voluntarily to a place of refuge, such as the acropolis : the pledge in the oath of 
72. I.Priene 44, ll. 17-18.
73. Compare a. chaniotis, « Normen stärker als Emotionen ? », p. 49-55.
74. IG XII 4 1 132.
75. IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 1-5. 
76. IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 41-78. Fines « of the road » (ll. 63-4) may have been paid to a fund for the upkeep of 
the road, or they may have been exacted as a penalty for offences relating to the road.
77. IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 79-118.
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reconciliation not to collaborate in future with anyone who seizes the Telian acropolis (τὰν 
ἄκραν) 78 may give a hint of that. This interpretation gains some force from comparative 
evidence for Greek stasis being provoked by political disputes about legal suits and fines 79.
The best guide to the political and ethical principles underlying this settlement is the 
civic oath, to be sworn by all citizens, proposed by the Coan arbitrators. This oath resembles 
the Dikaiopolitan oath in its grudging, contractual character 80 : the Telians were to swear to 
adhere to the established constitution, to preserve the democracy, not to bear grudges, not to 
break the terms of the settlement, not to seize the acropolis, not to allow anyone to attempt to 
dissolve the democracy, and to report any revolutionary plots or meetings 81. Citizens were thus 
to bind themselves to respect the constitution and the reconciliation, and not to use violence 
for political ends. They were not, however, required to promise to preserve ὁμόνοια, to show 
good will to fellow citizens or positively to promote the common good : contrast the stress on 
respect for the common good in another Hellenistic settlement and oath involving Coans, the 
later third-century BC oath uniting Cos and Kalymna in an appropriately titled homopoliteia 82. 
No space was given to the kinds of considerations about civic harmony and solidarity which 
elsewhere trumped considerations of strict justice and reciprocity in post-stasis contexts.
As at Dikaia, this more contractual model of civic order and relationships between citizens 
appears to have permitted greater engagement by the arbitrators than common elsewhere with 
questions of personal responsibility, deserts, recompense and reciprocity. The arbitrators did 
not engage in any formal judgements according to the laws : they apparently abstained from 
seeking to punish incumbent citizens or dissidents for actions committed after the disputes 
about the penalties escalated into stasis. However, they did attempt to achieve a measure 
of retrospective, quasi-punitive justice in relation to the original disputes : they proposed 
that at least some of those who had incurred penalties should still make amends for their 
original offences 83, in return for reintegration into the Telian citizen-body. Those who had 
incurred sacred and public penalties were to have their original penalties overturned and 
their confiscated property restored, if they contributed substitutes, in the form of money or 
« community service », for their original penalties 84. Those who had incurred sacred penalties 
had to contribute to a hecatomb, while those who had incurred public penalties were obliged 
78. IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 131-2.
79. h.-j. gehrKe, Stasis..., 208-210 ; compare especially Thuc. 3.70.3-6.
80. Compare also the oath to uphold civic order at Hellenistic Itanos, which is dominated by negative 
promises to abstain from disruptive behaviour : IC III iv 8, ll. 9-38.
81. IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 128-36. On this and comparable oaths, see e. Krob, « Serments et institutions civiques 
à Cos à l’époque hellénistique », REG 110, 1997, p. 434-453.
82. IG XII 4 1 152, esp. ll. 26-9.
83. Contrast, for example, the unconditional cancellation of past convictions at Hellenistic Alipheira (IPArk 
24, ll. 8-11).
84. IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 41-63, 66-85.
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both to pay money 85 and to repair an altar of Asklepios. The obligations in each case were 
chosen because they were equal in actual or equivalent financial value to the money outstanding 
from these individuals’ original penalties 86.
At Telos, therefore, Telian citizens and their Coan arbitrators were prepared to temper the 
pursuit of civic stability with some enforcement of perceived just deserts : the Telians agreed to 
the Coan proposal to impose quasi-penalties on some individuals, thereby implicitly attributing 
a measure of personal responsibility to them. This was quite probably partly because they held 
a quite contractual understanding of the nature of the Telian citizen-body, comparable to that 
attested at Dikaia. That contractual model of the good polis demanded and permitted great 
sensitivity to personal entitlements and deserts, even when that risked undermining perfect 
civic harmony and order.
7. – CONCLUSION  : THE DIKAIOPOLITAN CIVIC CONTRACT,  
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DIFFERENT FOURTH-CENTURY BC VISIONS 
OF THE GOOD POLIS
This article has shown that the arbitrators at Dikaia, and the citizens who approved 
their proposals, promoted and put into practice a notion of civic order and civic justice : a 
view of the good city as a contract for mutual security, advantage and justice, held together 
by procedures, laws, contracts and strict reciprocity. In a deviation from standard practice 
elsewhere, but in keeping with the ethical and political values central to their settlement, the 
Dikaiopolitans and their arbitrators even allowed some prosecutions for murder during the 
recent stasis, presumably including cases of indirect or complicit murder.
This was thus a rare case in which members of both factions in a stasis were potentially 
liable to prosecution, rather than only one or neither. In allowing this degree of retrospective 
justice, the arbitrators observed the demands of Dikaiopolitan civic values, even to an extent 
which could have threatened to destabilise the city once again, if murder trials again brought 
to the fore mutual resentments and contested interpretations of recent history and politics. 
The Dikaiopolitans thus made an interesting, distinctive, ideological choice within the broad 
85. Presumably part of the original sum. A certain Aristagoras was released from the obligation to pay any 
money in lieu of his fine, because he had deposited some property as surety when he was first accused. Nevertheless, 
since this property did not raise enough money to pay his fine, he was required to contribute to the repair of the altar. 
The requirement for the others in this category to pay the money, as well as repairing the altar, is stated only in the 
first account of the arbitrators’ decision regarding these men (on side A, fragment b). Its omission from the second 
(on side B, fragment a) may indicate that it was abandoned at a later stage, perhaps when the Telian assembly 
scrutinised the settlement. Alternatively, those involved may already have paid the money by the time the second 
account of the arbitrators’ decision was drawn up.
86. Cf. IG XII 4 1 132, 43-4, 54-7. For the construction in ll. 43-4, compare Dem. XLIII, Against 
Macartatus, 58. 
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spectrum of possibilities between retribution and forgiveness, or between justice and harmony, 
faced by any ancient or modern community seeking to achieve a sustainable reconciliation 
after a period of conflict.
The Dikaiopolitan and other ideas about reconciliation and civic order considered in this 
article also suggest some broader conclusions about the polis, especially the fourth-century 
BC polis. The Dikaiopolitan example, in particular, shows how abstract political values, and 
associated visions of civic order, could help to shape real political debates, decisions and 
identities within a polis. Such values and visions of order could also themselves be developed 
and debated within the scope of a polis assembly or other polis institutions : real, practical 
political exchange between citizens in the course of civic politics could itself offer a space 
for fundamental reflection about ethics and politics. It is principally for this reason that 
even apparently ad hoc and deeply practical documents of the kinds inscribed by poleis for 
public display, the products’ of citizens interactions within civic institutions, could set out, or 
presuppose, complex and coherent sets of political ideas. Inscriptions such as those considered 
in this article can make a crucial contribution to reconstructing the full scope and variety of 
ethical and political thinking within Greek poleis, when compared and contrasted with literary 
and philosophical texts.
The evidence discussed in this article also gives some indications of the content of debates 
about basic values which influenced, but also took place within, fourth-century civic political 
institutions. The Dikaiopolitan and other ideas about civic reconciliation considered here 
reflect, at a deeper level, the simultaneous influence within the Greek civic world of contrasting 
ideas about individuality and personal responsibility, and their implications for the nature of 
the good polis. Implicit in the contractual notion of civic order and justice evident in this text, 
and its provisions for retrospective justice, was a particular view about personal responsibility : 
individual citizens are responsible for their own actions, and should be consistently held to 
account for them. This approach contrasts with the one which Loraux has shown to dominate 
many Greek attitudes to stasis : the view that a stasis is a collective disease or madness « fallen 
from the sky », in which personal responsibility is blurred 87. When it was a matter of reflecting 
on a past stasis in one’s own polis, the way of thinking emphasised by Loraux was the one 
most consistent with strong patriotism, strong belief in the unity and virtue of the citizen-body, 
and strong attachment to the view that individuals are inextricably embedded in the values, 
practices and collective lives of their communities. It made possible the pretence that citizens 
had never really been divided or hostile to one another : they had simply been swayed by 
external pressures or by the manipulations of a few bad citizens. For example, the Spartan 
exiles who returned to Sparta in 179 BC blamed their exile on unspecified « tyrants » and 
87. See n. loraux, The Divided City..., esp. p. 22, 25 ; n. loraux, La tragédie d’Athènes  : la politique entre 
l’ombre et l’utopie, Paris 2005, esp. p. 31-79. For stasis as a disease of the body politic, see also r. brocK, Greek 
Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle, London 2013, p. 74-76.
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honoured Kallikrates for enabling their return, claiming that he had restored them « to the 
friendship which had existed from the beginning » (εἰς τὰν ἐξ ἀρχᾶς ἐ[οῦσαν] φιλ[ίαν]) 
with their fellow citizens 88.
In some cases, citizens took the additional step of attributing all responsibility for a stasis 
to a few deviants, a safe target for recriminations. At Athens after 403 BC, for example, the 
tradition developed that the whole people (the δῆμος) had been in exile : only the Thirty 
and a few other disreputable citizens had remained behind, disgracing the city 89. An example 
from later fourth-century BC Eresos shows that this strategy was also attempted elsewhere : a 
stele recording regulations about past tyrants represents two of the « tyrants », Eurysilaos and 
Agonippos, as having shut out of the city the people in its entirety (πανδαμί) 90. It is unlikely 
that the divisions within the Eresian citizen-body associated with the various tyrannical regimes 
had ever been so straightforward. Indeed, some of the tyrants’ descendants subsequently 
willingly agreed to submit to trial 91. This suggests that they did not consider their ancestors to 
have been isolated, vicious tyrants, but believed that they could construct a plausible defence 
of their family’s standing and honour.
The general approach to stasis which treated it as a disease or descent into chaos, or the 
ultimate responsibility of a few isolated deviants, made acceptable and desirable a wide-ranging 
amnesty and forgetting of wrongs. Most citizens were not individually guilty of any offences ; 
those who were had been unwittingly corrupted by deviant ringleaders. It could be hoped that, 
by means of an amnesty and the application of the collective medicine of political reform to the 
polis as a whole 92, the citizen-body would be restored to its natural, healthy and harmonious 
state, the opposite of the diseased collective state of stasis. 
The Dikaiopolitan approach, more oriented towards personal responsibility, demanded 
different practical measures. Not only were some murder trials allowed, but all citizens were 
to engage in mutual purification : the oath contains the promise « I will give and receive 
purification » (ll. 75-6) 93. This promise and the ritual it foreshadowed represented an implicit 
admission by each citizen that he was partly responsible for the stasis : each citizen, including 
himself, was partly guilty and partly polluted, and each would benefit from purification. There 
was to be no sweeping purification or forgetting of wrongs, accounting for all citizens through 
one generic decision. Rather, citizens were to engage as individuals in rituals of mutual 
purification, directly confronting their own personal responsibility and that of their opponents.
88. IvO 300, ll. 3-4.
89. Cf. r. thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens, Cambridge 1989, p. 132-138 ; 
n. loraux, The Divided City..., esp. p. 145-190, 245-264 ; a. wolpert, Remembering Defeat, Baltimore 2002, part 
II ; a. dössel, Die Beilegung..., p. 110-112, 141-142 ; s. forsdyKe, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy : the Politics 
of Expulsion in Ancient Greece, Princeton 2005, p. 262-263 ; j. shear, Polis and Revolution, p. 295-301.
90. rhodes-osborne, GHI 83, β side, ll. 1-3 and γ front, ll. 7-8.
91. rhodes-osborne, GHI 83, γ front, ll. 35-40.
92. See r. brocK, Greek Political Imagery..., p. 76.
93. For discussion of the role of purification in this document, see i. salVo, « Ristabilimento della pace civica 
e riti di purificazione a Dikaia », ASNP ser. 5, vol. 4.1, 2012, p. 89-102.
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The settlement’s treatment of purification shows that, even in those cases in which it 
was necessary to put aside strict justice, the Dikaiopolitans found it important to put unusual 
stress on personal responsibility and even guilt. In the « City of Justice », all would have 
to face the consequences of their actions, whether that meant facing « just » punishment or 
simply admitting personal responsibility and flaws. Indeed, strict reciprocity and personal 
responsibility were treated as crucial to the maintenance of Dikaia’s fundamental essence : a 
strictly « just » civic contract.
This kind of view of what a polis should be, identified in this article also at Telos, was 
thus in circulation in the Greek civic world, in competition with the more community-centred 
approaches studied by Loraux and others : it was possible for a fourth-century Greek to conceive 
his polis as first and foremost a just contract of citizens with quite egoistic aims and quite a high 
degree of personal agency, rather than a fraternal community of civic brothers. Fourth-century 
Greeks had constantly to take account of these different models, and the associated practical 
options, in their interactions as citizens of poleis, ensuring that the two principles balanced 
each other out in practice : for example, that concern for the common good balanced out 
concern to ensure that individuals received their just entitlements. In some circumstances, 
such as in the distribution of civic power and honours to benefactors, citizens had to make 
choices between those values 94. In particular, in the context of stasis and its consequences, 
they were faced with a stark, difficult, defining choice between the incompatible dictates of 
justice and harmony 95.
appendix : an alternatiVe interpretation of the treatment of murder trials in [arist.] 
ath. Pol. 39
A plausible alternative interpretation of the corrupt sentence about murder trials in 39.5 of 
the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, discussed in section 5 above, is that the sentence represents 
a continuation of the regulations for the future operation of the new two-community Athens, 
consisting of the community at Eleusis and the main civic community, which have dominated 
the rest of the chapter. This would make unsurprising the abruptness of the transition to 
discussion of murder trials in section 5. It would also explain why the following sentence 
begins τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων, apparently announcing a change of subject.
94. Consider, for example, debates about whether civic benefactors should be honoured with strictly « just », 
but possibly divisive, rewards, or whether they should be expected to contribute altruistically to civic welfare from 
an instinctive concern for harmony and the common good, of the kind echoed in Dem. XX, Against Leptines.
95. I explore this interpretation of Greek civic values and practices and its implications further in my 2011 
Oxford D.Phil thesis, « Exile and the Political Cultures of the Greek Polis, c. 404-146 BC », which I have been 
developing into a monograph entitled Stasis and Stability : The Greek Polis and its Political Thought Seen through 
Exile, c. 404-146 BC (forthcoming, Oxford 2015).
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The regulation about murder trials could well have been intended as a restriction on the 
autonomy of the new Eleusis community. Although that community was to be autonomous in 
most respects, and presumably to have its own courts, future cases involving murder « with 
one’s own hand » within the whole of Athenian territory would continue to be tried « in 
accordance with ancestral practice », on the Areopagos. It is quite plausible that all Athenians 
were anxious that cases of murder with one’s own hand should continue to be tried in the 
traditional way, even if they occurred in Eleusis : they could well have been afraid of the risks 
of pollution if traditional practices were not maintained, and some perpetrators of violence 
avoided a trial of the traditional sort. Admittedly, relevant trials could have required some 
movement of people between the two communities, something ostensibly incompatible with 
the ban on such movement (other than for the Eleusinian Mysteries) included earlier in the 
agreement 96. However, travelling to bring a murder suit or to face a murder trial would not have 
represented casual, everyday movement of the kind presumably envisaged in that provision. 
This interpretation has the advantage that it does not require that the author deviates 
chaotically between subjects : it makes the text of chapter 39 coherent, or even well-structured. 
Murder suits were simply one final area to be discussed in which it had been necessary to 
regulate closely the relations between the two communities, and to carefully define the 
autonomy of the Eleusis community. On this interpretation, the two usages of the phrase κατὰ 
τὰ πάτρια (« according to ancestral practice ») in chapter 39 also become very consistent with 
each other. The earlier usage also refers to Athenian civic practices which were to continue in 
the traditional way, despite the new two-community arrangement, in the interests of religious 
continuity and the overall religious welfare of the whole Athenian community : priests would 
continue to be appointed in the Eleusinian sanctuary κατὰ τὰ πάτρια 97. On the traditional 
interpretation of the clause about murder trials, it is hard to understand why the phrase κατὰ 
τὰ πάτρια was used at all : there would have been no obvious alternative way of holding 
murder trials relating to the stasis. On the interpretation offered here, by contrast, there was a 
clear alternative to trials κατὰ τὰ πάτρια : hypothetical future trials could have been held in 
the new courts of the Eleusis community. 
Since εἰ, not ἐάν, is preserved at the start of the corrupt protasis in the sentence about 
murder trials, the alternative interpretation under consideration here would probably require 
the restoration of aorist optatives later in that clause : « if anyone should [kill/wound/take 
revenge on] anyone with his own hand ». Consider, for example, Thalheim’s suggestion εἴ τίς 
τινα αὐτοχειρίᾳ ἐκτείσαιτο τρώσας (« if anyone should take revenge on anyone, having 
wounded him with his own hand »), which is much closer to the preserved papyrus letters than 
the dominant restoration 98. This restoration, or another with some verb for killing in the aorist 
96. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.2.
97. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.2.
98. t. thalheim, « Zu Aristoteles’ Αθηναίων Πολιτεία », BPW 29, 1909, p. 703, offers this restoration in 
support of his alternative view that the reference to hypothetical murder suits is a specific reference to possible suits 
arising from retaliatory post-stasis violence after the stasis. The verb ἐκτίνομαι could, however, have been used to 
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optative (e.g. κτείνειε or κτεῖναι) followed by the participle τρώσας, also has the advantage 
of being more consistent than the dominant restoration with the first half of the sentence, 
which refers only to murder suits, not to suits for wounding as well as murder. The use of 
the optative would be slightly irregular in this context, but it is possible to understand why 
Ps.-Aristotle or the authors of the original settlement might have chosen εἰ + optative, rather 
than ἐάν + subjunctive, the normal construction in legal Greek, at this point 99 : he or they could 
have wished to indicate that the prospect of future violence was more remote 100 than the more 
predictable, routine scenarios, such as new settlers buying houses in Eleusis or engaging in 
disputes about houses, described with ἐάν + subjunctive in sections 3-5.
Another objection which might be raised against the alternative interpretation offered here 
is that it is not consistent with the evidence of other sources. Some scholars have considered 
some passages of the Attic orators to support the view that cases of murder with one’s own 
hand were not covered by the amnesty of 403 BC. However, as I hope to argue in more detail 
elsewhere, none of these passages states, or even necessarily presupposes, such an exception 
from the amnesty : the view that they relate to such an exception from the amnesty relies on 
interpreting them in the light of the dominant interpretation of Athenaion Politeia 39, criticised 
above. Without that prop, alternative interpretations of the relevant passages become plausible 
or preferable 101.
refer to retributive violence more generally.
99. It was possible to combine protaseis with subjunctive and with optative within a single legal document : 
see IG IX 12 1 3, ll. 27-31.
100. For the use of εἰ + optative to convey remote possibility, see r. Kühner, b. gerth, Ausführliche 
Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, zweite Teil (Satzlehre), vol. II, Leipzig 1904, §576.
101. Relevant passages are : 
1. Andoc. I, On the Mysteries, 94, with r.j. bonner, g. smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer 
to Aristotle, Chicago 1930-1938, vol. II, p. 82 ; d. macdowell, Andokides On the Mysteries ; the text edited 
with introduction, commentary and appendices, Oxford 1962, p. 133, ad 1.94 ; and e. carawan, « Amnesty and 
Accountings... », p. 57-76, 69-70. For criticism of the view that this passage is connected to an exception from the 
amnesty, see p. cloché, La restauration démocratique..., p. 260.
2. Lysias XIII, Against Agoratus, 55-7 : Menestratos was convicted of murder, ostensibly on account of 
his role as an informer during the stasis. It could have been some kind of exception from the amnesty which 
made him liable for prosecution, even after the amnesty. However, no such exception is mentioned. Moreover, 
Menestratos had certainly not committed murder « with his own hand », so it is doubtful whether the specific 
exemption supposedly stated by Ps.-Aristotle could have been the relevant one. In any case, it is quite possible 
that the speaker simply makes it appear that the murder for which Menestratos was condemned occurred under the 
oligarchy ; it could in fact have happened later (a.h. sommerstein, a.j. bayliss, with contributions by l.a. KozaK 
and i.c. torrance, Oath and State in Ancient Greece, Berlin 2013, p. 137-8, discussing other bibliography).
3. Lysias XIII, Against Agoratus, 85-90, with e. carawan, Rhetoric..., p. 365-366, and s.j. todd, A 
Commentary on Lysias..., p. 639, with n. 55. One problem for the view that Agoratos’ defence is expected to involve 
a challenge to the claim that this suit is allowed by an exception from the amnesty of the kind under discussion 
here is that the dispute is about an ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ (« obvious guilt » or « immediate incrimination ») clause, not 
an αὐτοχειρίᾳ clause. Another is that the speaker claims that the fact that Agoratos contests the accuracy of ἐπ’ 
αὐτοφώρῳ implies that, if that phrase were not on the indictment, Agoratos would be liable for arrest (13.85), not 
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Admittedly, the alternative interpretation offered here is not itself secure ; it has some 
problems of its own. However, it seems to me to be more consistent with the structure of 
chapter 39 of the Athenaion Politeia than the dominant interpretation. If this alternative 
interpretation is even plausible, that reinforces the possibility that Ps.-Aristotle was not 
describing an exemption from the Athenian amnesty of 403 when he discussed murder trials 
in the corrupt sentence.
that he would then enjoy the automatic protection of the amnesty. A further difficulty is that the speaker goes on to 
present appeal to the amnesty as a separate possible argument which Agoratos might raise in his defence (13.88 : 
« I understand that he also intends to speak about the oaths and agreements »).
4. Harp. s.v. αὐθέντες, with e. carawan, « Amnesty and Accountings... », p. 57-76, 74-75. This fragment 
appears suggestive, but cannot by itself prove that the 403 BC amnesty included an αὐτοχειρίᾳ clause. It is entirely 
plausible that this fragment relates to a more general debate about where responsibility for the violence of the 
oligarchy lay, with the direct perpetrators or with their political masters. In any case, any formal αὐτοχειρίᾳ clause 
would not have been relevant to the subject of this fragment, the treatment of the Thirty themselves, who were, on 
most modern interpretations (but contrast e. carawan, « Amnesty and Accountings », p. 57-76), always excluded 
from the amnesty.

